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Abstract
Theoretical models generally always predict or assume that higher taxes lead
to larger informal sectors. Empirically, however, there is considerable debate on
the effect of taxes on informality. In this paper I show that whether a positive,
negative or non-relation arises between tax rates and informality depends on the
degree of tax enforcement and the level of credit market development in an economy.
Higher enforcement implies a higher probability of detection and punishment while
more credit implies better formal sector access to finance. Both are incentives to
become formal. In a two-sector dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing
constraints, I show that informality rises with the tax rate up to a threshold level of
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tax enforcement beyond which it falls as tax increases. This enforcement threshold
depends negatively on the level of credit in the economy.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore theoretically the effect of institutional differ-
ences on the relationship between tax and informality in a dynamic general equilibrium
framework. I specifically show that the different levels of tax enforcement and financial
development observed in developing versus developed economies play a crucial role in the
nature of the relationship that emerges between taxation and informality. I also find that
productive government expenditures do not matter in this context.
Taxation of output is viewed as a cost to operating in the formal sector. Therefore higher
tax rate(s) increase the incentive to underreport income and the prevalance of informal
or underground activity. Given this reasoning, theoretical models of the informal sector
almost automatically assume or find a positive relationship between taxation and tax
evasion (Ihrig and Moe, 2001; Busato and Chiarini, 2004; Amaral and Quintin, 2006;
Prado, 2011; D’Erasmo and Boedo, 2012; Mitra, 2013 and Charlot et al, 2015).
Empirically, however, there is less of a consensus on how taxes relate to informality.
Several empirical studies associate higher tax rates with a smaller informal sector while
others report a positive effect of taxes on informality. Schneider (2005) and La Porta and
Shleifer (2008), using different estimates of the informal sector and measures of taxation,
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find the latter to be an important driver of the informal sector size. Dabla-Norris et al
(2008) focus mainly on developing economies and report that taxes and informality are
significantly positively correlated but stronger legal and enforcement institutions reduce
the significance of taxes. In a panel analysis, similarly focusing on developing economies,
Liu-Evans and Mitra (2015), find informality to be significantly positively correlated
with taxes and significantly negatively correlated with different proxies for enforcement.
Djankov et al (2010) report a positive correlation between corporate tax rates and in-
formal sector size for 85 countries, a large majority of which are developing economies.
Gorodnichenko et al. (2009), study a major tax reform in Russia and find a large positive
elasticity of evasion with respect to the tax rate.
Unlike the above studies, authors who look at transition and OECD economies find
contrasting results. Johnson et al. (1997) and Johnson et al. (1998) conclude that tax
rates are negatively correlated with the size of the informal sector. However, the simple
model provided by Johnson et al. (1997), contrary to their empirical findings, implies a
positive relationship between tax rates and the size of the informal sector. When Johnson
et al. (1998) take into account composite indices of both tax rates and quality of tax
administrations, they find that these indices are positively correlated with the size of
the informal sector, thus supporting their claim that both administration of taxes and
regulatory discretion play key roles in the tax-informality relationship. Friedman et al.
(2000) suggest that the positive correlation between tax and informality are the result of
poor institutional factors such as corruption and bureaucratic quality. They find some
evidence that a higher direct tax rate reduces informal sector size but the result loses
significance when they control for per capita income in order to account for the fact that
richer countries have better institutions. More bureaucracy, greater corruption, and a
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weaker legal environment, on the other hand, are all associated with a larger unofficial
economy even after controlling for per capita income in their sample. Similarly, Aruoba
(2010) finds, using a much larger group of countries, that institutions play a key role in
determining the effect of taxes on informality.
Thus empirical studies remain largely divided on the effect of tax on informality, al-
though, there appears to be greater agreement in the literature on the important role of
institutions. There especially seems to be a contrast in the way taxes affect informality in
developed and developing economies. Goel and Nelson (2016), for instance, find that de-
terminants of the shadow economy differ across developing and developed economies with
the differences mainly arising from the disparate nature of institutional quality in these
economies. They also find an increase in their measure of the tax rate promotes informal
sector growth in developing economies while stemming it in developed economies.
In this paper I argue that tax enforcement and the level of financial market development
play key roles in the nature of the tax-informality relationship that emerges in an economy.
I do so in a two sector dynamic general equilibrium model with borrowing constrained
formal and informal entrepreneurs. I do not, however, study how the informal sector
comes into being, but given that such a sector exists, I investigate the role played by
institutional differences in the tax-informality relationship.
Lower tax enforcement implies a lower probability of being caught and punished while
less developed domestic credit markets imply formal businesses have less or no access to
formal sources of financing, thus lowering the incentive to be formal. Thus both lower
tax enforcement and lower FD give rise to larger informal sectors and the degree and
importance of these effects with respect to the informal sector’s size have been addressed
in the literature (see among others Amaral and Quintin, 2006; Quintin 2007; Antunes and
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Cavalcanti, 2007, Liu-Evans and Mitra, 2015 and Berdiev and Saunoris, 2016). In this
paper, I extend the line of argument to the relationship between taxes and informality.
Specifically, I show that higher taxes reduce (raise) informality when enforcement and
credit market institutions are well (less) developed. I identify a critical value of tax
enforcement below which taxes and informality are positively related and above which
the relationship is a negative one. Taxes exert no effects on informality when enforcement
is at or around its threshold value.
The reasoning behind the contrasting effects of tax on informality is as follows: As
taxes are raised the cost of formal production rises with probability 1, while the informal
sector’s cost of production rises with the probability of being detected (and the stringency
of the punishment associated with detection). Higher enforcement which is associated
with better enforcement institutions give rise to a higher probability of detection and
associated penalty hence a larger increase in the expected cost of informal production
with taxes. This latter implies the informal sector expands less with taxes at higher
enforcement. In other words, as enforcement increases the positive relationship between
tax and informality becomes weaker until at a high enough probability of detection, taxes
do not affect informality at all and beyond this level of enforcement, informality falls with
taxes since the cost of hiding is too high.
Of course if formal businesses enjoy high quality access to official sources of financing
then there is greater incentive for informal producers to become formal and enforcement
needs to rise less to convince informal producers to switch to paying taxes. In my model,
as financial development progresses formal businesses are able to borrow more against
their income or output which increases the size of this sector relative to the informal
sector. Additionally, the expansion of the formal sector brings about an increase in the
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demand for and hence the price of resources used in formal production. In our simple
model economy labor is the only factor of production implying the competitive wage rate
rises due to the higher formal labor demand at higher FD. At this higher cost of labor, the
same increase in the tax rate causes a smaller expansion in the size of the informal sector
and enforcement needs to rise less in order to clear the bar beyond which informality
becomes decreasing in the tax rate.
This paper contributes to the literature in two main ways. Firstly, unlike the large liter-
ature studying the determinants of informality this paper focuses on the determinants of
the tax-informality relationship. Understanding this latter has become especially impor-
tant in light of the varied empirical results in the literature. Secondly, this paper provides
a simple theoretical construct which allows tax rates and informality to be related either
positively, negatively or not at all depending on the level and quality of enforcement
and credit market institutions. This provides a departure from the existing models of
informal sector that generally predict or assume a positive relationship between tax and
informality in contrast to existing empirical findings.
Elgin (2015) is the only exception to my knowledge - he builds a dynamic political econ-
omy model and shows that greater political stability may be associated with a negative
relationship between tax and informality while less politically stable countries may ex-
hibit a positive relationship between the two. Specifically, in his model, public capital
is mainly utilized by the formal sector which implies that countries in which incumbent
parties are more likely to stay in power have a higher tax burden but a smaller informal
sector. The current paper provides a complementary explanation for the varied relation-
ship observed between taxes and informality across countries by sketching out channels
through which tax enforcement and financial development may play important roles. I
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calibrate my model to a typical emerging market economy, Brazil, and conduct numerical
simulations which sketches the changing relationship between tax rate and informality
for different levels of enforcement and FD while all other parameters remain constant. I
extend the application of my model to other countries in the sensitivity analysis section.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 presents an analysis of the data
and some simple correlations to motivate the contrasting effects of tax on informality
in developing versus developed economies before delving into the model in Section 3
which presents a novel theory of interaction between (credit market and enforcement)
institutions and their effects on the tax-informality relationship, Section 4 discusses the
results and conducts quantitative analyses, Section 5 considers an extension of the model
and Section 6 concludes.
2. Data and Motivation
This section documents the link between taxation and informality in developing and
developed country groups and presents some other indicative statistics to motivate the
theoretical work. I compile two separate data sets for the two country groups using data
from different sources. My starting point is the informal sector’s share in GDP estimated
by Schneider et al (2007) for developing, developed and (formerly) transition economies.
I use this influential study to create my groups of developing and developed economies
and their respective informal sector sizes. For the purposes of this paper I class transition
economies in the developed country group for two reasons. Firstly, OECD and transition
economies by themselves constitute too few data points in comparison to the developing
economies group in Schneider et al (2010), who report results for 25 OECD, 21 formerly
7
transition and 88 developing economies. Secondly, due to a lack of data availability,
my data source for the proxy for financial development differs across developing and
developed economies, with the data for transition economies derived from the same source
as the developed group of countries as discussed below. Lastly, earlier influential studies
(Friedman et al 2000 and Johnson et al, 1997, 1998) have similarly grouped these countries
together. That said, the main results do not change when calculated for developed and
transition countries separately with the latter generally mimicking the results of the
OECD economies. The average informal sector size in Scneider et al (2010) covers the
years 1999-2007. So for the rest of my variables, after compiling the data, I calculate the
averages over the same years, or less if data for all years are not available.
As is common in the literature I use the Rule of Law index from the Worlwide Governance
Indicators (WGI) dataset, see Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010), as institutional
proxy for level of tax enforcement (Aruoba, 2010; Dabla-Norris et al, 2008; Liu-Evans
and Mitra, 2016). For financial development, I use the private credit to GDP ratio from
the World Development Indicators (WDI) database provided by the World Bank. How-
ever, most developed and transition economies are absent from this data set so for these
economies I use private sector debt as a fraction of GDP from the Financial Indicators
Series of the OECD database.
I use three different measures of tax rates. Income tax is the composite of taxes on
income, profits and capital gains as a % of total taxes, obtained from the WDI database
of the World Bank. Tax revenue as a % of GDP is also obtained from the WDI and
is commonly used in the literature as a measure of the tax burden. Both these tax
measures are averaged over the period 1999-2007 for every country in each group. My
corporate income tax rate is from Paying Taxes 2007, compiled by the World Bank and
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Pricewaterhouse Coopers for the Doing Business project. It is based on the findings of a
survey which looked at the corporate tax position of a standard modest-sized company
in 175 countries 2006.
Developing Developed
N Mean SD N Mean SD
rl 83 -0.32 0.68 44 0.81 0.98
fd 50 0.34 28.9 28 1.86 58.5
inf 85 0.35 11.34 44 0.24 12.3
Corporate tax 80 0.195 10.8 43 0.17 10.33
Income tax 71 0.22 10.83 43 0.25 14.6
Rev. as % of GDP 68 0.16 9.88 43 0.18 5.88
Table 1: Description of data by developing and developed country groups. N = num-
ber of observations, SD = standard deviation, rl =Rule of Law index, fd =financial
development, inf =informal output to GDP ratio.
A summary of the data is presented in Table 1. The Rule of Law index is very low
(negative in fact) for the developing country group as is the proxy for FD, compared
to developed economies. The informal sector is much larger in developing economies,
however, the different measures of tax used are not very different across the two country
groups. While corporate tax is a shade higher in developing economies, both the income
tax rate and tax revenue as a fraction of GDP are higher in case of developed economies.
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Figure 1: Different tax measures and informality for developing economies.
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Figure 2: Different tax measures and informality for developed economies.
Figures 1 and 2 plot the 3 different measures of tax rates against the informal sector size
estimated in Scneider et al (2010) for the group of developing and developed economies
respectively. A positive relationship emerges between the corporate tax rate and the
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informal sector size in developing economies in Figure 1, while the income tax rate and
tax revenue as a fraction of GDP display no clear link with informality for the same
group of countries. Figure 2 reveals, contrastingly, a strong negative association between
informality and the tax rate for developed economies irrespective of the measure of tax
rate used. Thus two clear features are revealed by this comparison: the informal sector is
related either positively or not at all to taxes in developing economies while it is related
negatively to taxes in developed economies.
Correlations Developing Developed
ρ(rl, inf) -0.37 -0.86
ρ(fd, inf) -0.11 -0.53
ρ(rl, fd) 0.62 0.66
Table 2: rl =Rule of Law index, fd =financial development, inf =informal output to
GDP ratio.
Table 2 further highlights that both Rule of Law and FD are strongly negatively corre-
lated with informality in developed economies while Rule of Law seems to matter more
for informality in developing economies with FD displaying a very weak negative corre-
lation with the informal sector size. Finally, Rule of Law and FD are strongly positively
correlated in both country groups. Thus, economies with better enforcement and well
developed financial markets tend to have smaller informal sectors but financial markets
matter more for informality in developed economies. These findings are also confirmed
by Liu-Evans and Mitra (2015) who find that informality is significantly positively re-
lated to the tax rate and significantly negatively related to the Rule of Law in developing
economies while FD did not exert any significant direct effect on informality. Dabla-
Norris et al (2008) also find, using firm level survey data for 40 developed and developing
economies that the quality of the legal framework is crucially important in determining
the size of the informal sector and the significance of financial constraints is reduced in
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the context of a well functioning legal system. The focus of these studies, however, is on
the determinants of informality rather than the tax informality relationship which is the
main focus of this paper.
In sum, the following observations emerge from this section: Firstly, informality is related
non-negatively to taxes in developing economies while it is strongly negatively related to
taxes in developed economies. Secondly, tax enforcement proxied by the Rule of Law
index is very low in developing economies as is the level of FD compared to developed
economies. Finally, enforcement or Rule of Law is an important determinant of informal-
ity in both developing and developed economies whereas better financial markets seem
to matter more for informality in developed economies.
3. Model Environment
I consider a model economy where formal and informal entrepreneurs co-exist and produce
the same homogenous output. Formal entrepreneurs are defined as those that pay tax on
their output with probability 1 while informal agents are those that pay no taxes unless
they are caught by inspectors and made to pay the tax they owe. I also assume (in
line with Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Ihrig and Moe, 2001 and Busato and Chiarini,
2004) that being detected implies paying a penalty, which, if large enough, could make
the expected tax payment of the informal sector larger than the tax paid by the formal
sector. The combination of the probability of audit and the penalty for evasion determines
the stringency of tax enforcement in the economy. How large enforcement is, in turn
determines how much a tax-increase raises the cost of operating in the formal sector
relative to the informal sector. Entrepreneurs can borrow but only against declared
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income, implying only formal entrepreneurs can participate and borrow in credit markets.
Both entrepreneurs and households maximize consumption. The main difference between
them is that the former own production technologies using which they convert labor input
to output. They use this output and any additional borrowing to pay their wage bill and
consume. Households own no such production technology but supply labor to the two
sectors and lend to the formal sector. They consume out of their wage and interest income
each period.
Entrepreneurs
Representative formal and informal entrepreneurs maximize consumption,
MaxEt
∞∑
t=0
γt ln ci,t,
where i = 1, 2 stands for formal and informal entrepreneurs respectively, ci is their con-
sumption in period t and γ is the discount factor.
As in Koreshkova (2006) and Prado (2011), production occurs using labor and technology,
yi,t+1 = Ai,t(li,t)
α,
where the ith firm hires labor (l) in period t to produce output (y) in period t + 1. I
assume that tax evading firms have lower productivity than the formal sector in keeping
with the findings of La Porta and Shleifer (2008). Ai,t are the sectoral productivities at
date t. The formal sector’s productivity is at the frontier and given by A1,t = At where
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At is common knowledge and follows a first order autoregressive process,
logAt = ρA logAt−1 + eAt ,
where eAt are zero-mean, i.i.d. innovations. Following Koreshkova (2006), we assume the
inferior informal-sector technology is given by A2,t = φA1,t such that 0 < φ ≤ 1, where φ
reflects the difference in sectoral productivities.
The production function implies that entrepreneurs need to hire labor and pay the wage
bill before production occurs thus creating a role for borrowing. This is similar to Aoki,
Benigno and Kiyotaki (2010) and Aoki and Kalin (2015) who use the same production
function and motivate their borrowing constraints similarly. I assume, as in these papers,
that borrowing occurs against expected future income of the entrepreneurs which implies
that informal entrepreneurs, since they hide their production, cannot participate in fi-
nancial markets and financial development only affects the formal sector’s labor demand.
More specifically, the formal sector borrows according to,
Rtb1,t ≤ Etθy1,t+1,
while the informal sector’s borrowing constraint is given by,
Rtb2,t ≤ 0.
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Rt is the gross interest rate, bi is the amount of borrowing/lending and θ is the fraction
of output up to which formal entrepreneurs can borrow - it is an efficiency parameter and
measures the level of FD in the model1
The formal and informal sector’s budget constraints are respectively given by,
c1,t +Rtb1,t−1 + wtl1,t = (1− τ)y1,t + b1,t, (1)
c2,t +Rtb2,t−1 + wtl2,t = (1− pτ)y2,t + b2,t. (2)
Consumption and wage bill on the left is financed by output and net borrowing on the
right. Labor is perfectly mobile between sectors and wt is the competitive wage rate. In
equation (2), with a probability (1− p) informal entrepreneurs retain their entire income
y2,t, but with probability p they are caught and made to pay the tax evaded along with a
fine. p is a measure of the level of tax enforcement in the model and can be interpreted
in one of two ways as in Ihrig and Moe (2004). If the informal agent faces a probability
p of being caught, and when caught, the agent only pays tax on output at the rate of τ ,
then the value of pτ ranges from 0 to τ . However, as in Allingham and Sandmo (1972),
the taxpayer may have to pay tax on the undeclared amount, at a penalty rate which
is higher than τ . In this case p is the product of the probability of audit (< 1) and the
penalty which is a proportion (> 1) of τ . In the latter interpretation, the upper bound
on the value of pτ is greater than the tax rate in the formal sector.
1Note that it does not matter for the paper’s qualitative results if entrepreneurs were borrowing
against assets (capital) instead of output, as is often used in the literature. In this case, informal agents
would hide their assets (not output) from the authorities which would allow them to escape paying taxes
on the income generated by these assets. This would preclude them from borrowing in financial markets
implying, as in the current version, FD only benefits formal firms by allowing them to borrow and invest
more.
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The first order conditions of the entrepreneurs are,
wt
1
c1,t
= (γ
1
c1,t+1
(1− τ) + λ1θ)αAtlα−11,t (3)
wt
1
c2,t
= (γ
1
c2,t+1
(1− pτ))αφAtlα−12,t (4)
1
ci,t
= Et[γRt+1
1
ci,t+1
+ λiRt]. (5)
λi are the Lagrange multipliers for the borrowing constraints faced by the entrepreneurs.
Equations (3) and (4) are the first order conditions with respect to labor for the formal
and informal entrepreneurs respectively. Both sectors equate the marginal productivity
of hiring an additional unit of labor, on the right hand side, to its marginal cost on the
left to arrive at their respective labor demands. Note that the marginal productivity
of labor in the formal sector, internalizes the additional benefit an extra unit of labor
brings, in the form of greater borrowing, while labor productivity in the informal sector
is not affected by the level of borrowing in the economy. Thus the amount of borrowing
taking place in the economy impacts the sectoral labor productivities differently which is
crucial for the effect FD has in the model. Equation (5) relates the marginal benefit of
borrowing by the sectors to its marginal cost.
Households
Households supply labor to both sectors and also lend to the formal sector. They maxi-
mize consumption as follows,
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Max Et
∞∑
t=0
βt(c3,t −
l
1+ 1
η
s,t
(1 + 1
η
)
)
subject to
c3,t +Rb3,t−1 = wtls,t + b3,t,
where c3 is household consumption and ls is total labor supplied. β is the household dis-
count factor such that β > γ in order to allow credit flows and ensure that the borrowing
constraints bind. This is a common assumption in the literature and is discussed further
below.
The household’s first order conditions are,
lηs,t = wt (6)
1
c3
= βRtEt
1
c3,t+1
. (7)
Government
A government collects τy1,t from the formal sector with certainty and pτy2,t from the
informal sector given enforcement level p, in tax revenue, which is used to finance gov-
ernment consumption, gt = τy1,t + pτy2,t. I assume here that government expenditures
are wasteful. In Section 5, I relax this assumption to include productive government
expenditures.
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Timing
The timing of the model economy is as follows: Entrepreneurs enter period t with output
yi,t (produced by labor hired in t−1), where i = 1, 2 stands for formal and informal firms
respectively. They observe their productivity (Ai,t) in period t, decide on their labor
demand and the investment on wage bill. They then borrow, hire workers, pay the wage
bill and consume. The payment of wages and consumption in period t therefore occurs
out of the beginning of period output (yi,t) and net borrowing (bi,t−Rtbi,t). At the start
of next period they obtain output yi,t+1 and the process starts all over again.
Thus when (formal) entrepreneurs borrow in period t they have already observed the
period t productivity and know with certainty what their next period’s output is going
to be. The borrowing constraint stipulates entrepreneurs can borrow up to a fraction
(θ for formal and 0 for informal entrepreneurs) of this fully known future income thus
precluding default in the model.
4. Equilibrium and steady state
Definition of Equilibrium
For a list of policies [τ , p, θ], and technology, At, a competitive equilibrium is given
by a list of consumption plans, production plans and debt positions [ci,t, yi,t, li,t, bi,t], for
entrepreneurs i = [1, 2]; a list of consumption plans and debt positions [c3,t, b3,t] for the
household; and prices, [wt, Rt] such that (i)[ci,t, li,t, bi,t] maximize entrepreneur i’s expected
utility subject to their respective production functions, budget constraints and borrowing
constraints, (ii) [c3,t, b3,t] maximize household’s expected utility subject to their budget
constraint, and (iii) Labor, goods and bond markets clear such that,
∑2
i=1 li,t = ls,t,
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∑3
i=1 ci,t + gt =
∑2
i=1 yi,t, and
∑3
i=1 bi,t = 0, given [Ai,t−1, li,t−1].
In a steady-state equilibrium all variables are constant. Such an equilibrium can be char-
acterized using the following system of eight equations in the eight unknowns, R, λ, y1, y2, l1, l2, ls, w
thus proving that the steady state exists.
1 = βR (8)
1
ci
= γR
1
ci
+ λiR (9)
w
1
c1
= (γ
1
c1
(1− τ) + λ1θ)αy1
l1
(10)
w
1
c2
= (γ
1
c2
(1− pτ))αy2
l2
(11)
ls = w
1/η (12)
y1 = A1l
α
1 (13)
y2 = φA1l
α
2 (14)
ls = l1 + l2 (15)
Equation (8) is the euler equation of households and equation (9) gives the first order
conditions with respect to borrowing for the entrepreneurs where i={1,2}. Equations (10)
and (11) are the first order conditions with respect to labor for the formal and informal
entrepreneurs respectively. Equation (12) is the first order condition for the household’s
labor supply. Equations (13) and (14) are the formal and informal sector’s production
functions respectively and equation (15) is the labor market clearing condition.
Equation (8) gives the steady state interest rate which is R = 1/β. Once we know the
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interest rate R, we can determine λi from equation (9) such that λi = (β − γ)1/ci. Thus
for any β > γ, λi is positive implying the borrowing constraints are binding for both
the entrepreneurs. In other words, entrepreneurs always borrow the maximum possible
amount, which at steady state implies b1 =
θy1
R
and b2 = 0 (from the respective borrowing
constraints in Section 3).
Substituting λ1 into equations (10) and (11) gives the steady state labor input in each
sector, l1 and l2. Assuming, s = l2/l1, we get,
s =
(
(1− pτ)φ
(1− τ) + (β−γ)θ
γ
) 1
1−α
. (16)
Equation (16) gives the steady-state inter-sectoral allocation of labor. This is a key
equation of the model as it determines the steady state allocation of labor across formal
and informal sectors in the economy. It states the informal sector’s size relative to the
formal sector is a function of the tax rate (τ), the enforcement parameter (p), the level
of FD (θ) and the discount rates of the two types of entrepreneurs (β and γ). The first
three are policy variables in my model while the last two are parameters. These variables
and parameters vary by country which determine in turn the relative informal sector size
that arises in any given country.
We assume the economy is at this steady state at the start of our analysis, that is, before
taxes and other policy variables change. It is helpful therefore to first pin down this steady
state allocation of labor and hence the informal sector size relative to the formal sector.
We do this in the next section in the context of Brazil, a typical developing economy
with a large informal sector, such that the steady state relative size of the informal sector
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predicted by equation (16) reflects the average informal sector size for Brazil in the data
over the relevant period. We also apply the model to other countries in Section 4.3 and
conduct robustness analyses.
It is straightforward to see from equation (16) that, δs/δp < 0 and δs/δθ < 0. These
relations are well established in the literature and discussed in Section 1. In addition,
here we show that the following proposition holds.
Proposition 1. There exists a threshold value of enforcement, p¯, such that when p < p¯,
δs
δτ
> 0 and when p > p¯, δs
δτ
< 0 and p¯ is given by,
p¯ =
γ
θβ + (1− θ)γ . (17)
Proof. Differentiating Eq. (16) with respect to τ , gives
δs
δτ
=
1
1− α
(
(1− pτ)φγ
γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ
) α
1−α
(−pφγ(γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ)− (1− pτ)φγ(−γ)
(γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ)2
)
For δs
δτ
> 0, the term within the second set of brackets on the right hand side must be
positive, or, 1− pτ > p((γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ) which implies p < γ
θβ+(1−θ)γ .
From equation (17), p¯ depends negatively on FD implying when FD is low (high) the
threshold level of enforcement beyond which the relationship between tax and informality
becomes negative is high (low). The intuition is as follows; When enforcement is low, an
increase in the tax rate raises the cost of operating formally relative to the informal sector
given that the former’s actual tax payment rises relative to the expected tax payment
of the latter. Thus informal employment and output grow relative to the formal sector.
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At a higher p, however, responsiveness of informal production to a tax rate increase is
dampened since the expected tax rate of this sector, pτ increases more with taxes. When
p is at or close to p¯, tax rates have no effect on informality and beyond p¯, the increase in
the expected tax payment of the informal sector is large enough that the same increase in
the tax rate causes informal employment and output to fall relative to the formal sector.
When FD is higher, the marginal product of labor of formal firms is higher (see equation
3) and this sector increases their borrowing in order to invest in the wage bill, so their
demand for labor rises. This effect of FD implies the formal sector’s labor demand and
output falls less with a tax rate increase when FD is higher. As formal employment
and output falls less with taxes, the wage rate falls less as well causing hiring by the
informal sector and their output to increase less in turn. Thus when FD is higher,
the informal sector’s incentive to expand is lower so there is less reallocation of labor
from formal to informal sectors with a tax rate hike. In other words, FD weakens the
positive relationship between tax and informality. As explained above an increase in
p also works by dampening the positive tax-informality relationship. At higher FD, the
existing (positive) tax-informality relationship is weaker to begin with, implying, a smaller
increase in enforcement is required to clear the threshold, p¯, beyond which informality
falls with the tax rate.
5. Quantitative Analysis
In this section we calibrate the model to Brazil and quantitatively analyze the results of
the model.
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5.1. Calibration
The time period is a quarter. I set the discount factor of the households to β = 0.975
corresponding to a quarterly interest rate of 2.5% or an average annual interest rate
of 10% between 2000-2005 (Segura-Ubiergo, 2012). The entrepreneurs’ discount factor,
γ = 0.70, is set lower than values commonly used in the literature on collateral constraints
(for example Iacoviello (2008) and Iacoviello and Neri (2010)). A lower γ ensures that
p¯ varies over a wider range with changes in FD, however, the results go through with
higher γ’s as well.
Following Aoki et al (2009), I set the Frisch elasticity of labor to η = 3. Labor’s income
share is set to α = 0.68. The productivity ratio, φ = A2/A1 = 0.70, lies within the range
calculated by La Porta and Shleifer (2008). The benchmark FD, θ = 0.48, is the average
of the World Bank’s measure of domestic credit to the private sector as a % of GDP, for
Brazil between 1990-2013. It is described as a measure of ”financial resources provided
to the private sector by financial corporations”. The tax rate, τ = 0.33, is the average
revenue to GDP ratio for Brazil between 1990-2012 obtained from the OECD database
for Latin America.
The volatility of the aggregate productivity shock, σ is set to 0.016 to account for
the higher volatility of emerging market business cycles (Aguiar and Gopinath (2007),
Neumeyer and Perri (2005)). The persistence of the shock is set to the standard value of
ρ = 0.95.
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5.2. Quantitative Analysis
θ p¯
0 1
0.25 0.93
0.45 0.88
0.75 0.81
1.1 0.75
2.0 0.625
Table 3: Values of p¯ for different FD (θ).
Table 3 displays the values of p¯ for different levels of FD as implied by equation (17). As
FD goes from 0, implying entrepreneurs cannot borrow at all, to a high of 2, consistent
with a credit limit of 200% of the entrepreneurs’ income (observed in the developed
country group), p¯ falls from 1 to 0.625.
Figure 3 plots the tax-informality relationships for different levels of enforcement across
a range of FD. At lower levels of enforcement, the model generates a positive relation-
ship between tax and informality (the ratio of informal to formal output). The positive
relationship is especially strong when FD is low as well. However at higher levels of
FD considered, the levels of enforcement at which the tax-informality curves become
negatively sloped is lower.
A visual comparison of panels (a) through (d) of Figure 3 shows that FD lowers both
the mean and the spread of the tax-informality curves across the different levels of p.
Specifically, FD not only shrinks the size of informal output but also causes informality
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Figure 3: Changes in informal to formal output ratio with tax rates for different levels of
enforcement and FD.
to rise less with the tax rate for any given level of enforcement. When FD = 0.25, in
panel (a) of Figure 3, at the lowest enforcement of 10% (the blue line), a tax rate of
20% corresponds to a relative informal sector size of 42%. As the tax rate is increased
to 30%, informality rises to 53%, an increase of 27%. The same increase in the tax rate,
for the same enforcement level causes a much lower increase in informality in panel (b),
where FD = 0.75. Now informality goes from 30% to 36%, an increase of 21%. Thus FD
reduces both the level of informality and its response to a tax rate hike.
When enforcement is high enough, in Figure 3, the tax-informality relationship switches
sign and turns negative. In order to see the change in slopes more clearly, Figure 4 plots
the percentage changes in informality brought about by a tax rate change for the same
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levels of enforcement and FD considered in Figure 3. Specifically, in Figure 4, all the
tax-informality curves of Figure 1 are normalized to begin at 100 in order to facilitate a
comparison of their slopes.
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Figure 4: Percentage changes in informal to formal output ratio with tax rates for different
levels of enforcement and FD. Initial value of each curve in Figure 1 is indexed to 100.
A comparison, of all four panels of Figure 4 shows that as FD progresses, the slopes
of the positive tax-informality curves fall at lower levels of p, and beyond p¯ the slopes
(and the number) of the negatively sloped curves increase. When FD is only 25%, the
tax-informality relationship turns negative beyond a high p¯ = 0.93 according to Table
3, such that in panel (a) of Figure 4, only at p = 0.95 does the tax-informality curve
become downward sloping, although the effect is negligible. However, at a much higher
FD of 110% the relationship becomes negative beyond p = 0.75 as indicated by Table
3 and therefore in panel (c) of Figure 4, the tax-informality curve becomes very slightly
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downward sloping at p = 0.75 but discernibly so by the time p reaches 0.95. Finally,
when FD is 200%, representing an economy that is highly financially developed, the tax-
informality relationship is negative for any p beyond the p¯ = 0.625 according to Table
3. In panel (d) of Figure 4, therefore, the tax-informality curves are strongly downward
sloping both at p = 0.75 and p = 0.95.
5.3. Sensitivity analysis
How does p¯ change across countries? From equation (17), the only parameter that p¯
depends on, other than the policy variable θ, is the ratio β/γ. Holding γ constant, we
vary this ratio by changing the values of β2. Recall β is given by the inverse of the gross
real interest rate and the latter differs across countries.
Table 4 reports the quarterly real interest rates in a selected group of countries encom-
passing both developed and developing economies, and the corresponding values of β for
the year 20043. The column θ reports the level of financial development given by the pri-
vate credit to GDP ratios in these economies during the same year and the final column
reports the model generated values of p¯ given the country-specific values of β/γ and θ.
Real interest rate data are from the World Bank website. All other data sources are the
same as in Section 2.
2I am not aware of any cross-country studies of γ.
3I choose this year since it lies near the middle of the time period considered in our correlation analysis
of Section 2 (1999-2007).
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Country r R β θ p¯
India 1.23 1.01 0.987 0.36 0.87
Italy 0.73 1.007 0.993 0.68 0.78
Spain 0.045 1.0005 0.999 0.99 0.70
South Africa 1.12 1.011 0.988 1.27 0.656
Denmark 1.16 1.012 0.989 1.42 0.63
United Kingdom 0.36 1.004 0.996 1.45 0.62
Table 4: Enforcement threshold p¯ for country-specific values of θ and β. r is the quarterly
real interest rate while R is its gross value. All values are for 2004 except Spain and
Denmark for which 2002 values are reported since this was the latest date for which
interest rate data was available for these countries.
The countries in Table 4 are arranged in increasing order of FD (θ) and as in our earlier
quantitative analysis, we find that p¯ decreases as θ rises, only in this case, β’s are changing
too, since we take into account country-specific interest rates.
Although β does not vary by much across countries in Table 4, from equation (17), it can
be shown that the ratio β/γ is negatively related to p¯. Thus a rise in β holding γ constant
should lead to a lower p¯ all else equal. In Table 4 this implies that between Spain and
Denmark, for instance, Denmark enjoys a lower p¯ than Spain due to the former’s more
developed financial markets. However, Spain has a higher β than Denmark, implying
Spain’s p¯ is lower than it would have been if it had the same β as Denmark.
The intuition is that a higher discount factor implies households value the future more
relative to the entrepreneurs or the degree of patience of households increases further
relative to the entrepreneurs. This implies households are willing to save more thus
making more funds available in the economy for borrowing for the same level of FD. In
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other words, at higher β more debt is available as a fraction of formal output making
formal production more lucrative, which, all else equal, makes for a lower enforcement
threshold. FD however, is by far the bigger influence on p¯.
The results of this and the previous section imply, economies with both well developed
domestic financial markets and better enforcement mechanisms in place can generally
enjoy a negative relationship between tax and informality while the opposite is true for
economies with poorer financial markets and lax enforcement. From Section 2, developed
economies have much better enforcement and higher levels of FD on average, compared
to developing economies which have poorer enforcement mechanisms and underdeveloped
financial markets making the latter more prone to experiencing the non-negative relation-
ship between tax and informality documented in the same section. Furthermore, given
the strong positive correlation between enforcement and FD in Section 2, for both coun-
try groups, the tradeoff between an enforcement threshold and FD, implied by equation
(17) above, becomes more relevant as countries become more developed.
5.4. Discussion
The threshold values of enforcement obtained in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 above may seem
quite high still especially for the higher levels of FD considered. However, recall that p
includes both the probability of audit and a penalty for evading which is usually greater
than 1. For example, the enforcement threshold given by Table 3, of 0.63 at FD = 2,
can be generated using a probability of audit of 35% and a penalty of 1.8 times the tax
evaded. Similarly, a 40% probability of being detected and a penalty of 2 times the tax
payable, implies an enforcement level of 0.8 while, even with a 25% probability of being
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detected, a penalty of three times the tax rate, gives rise to an enforcement level of 0.75.
These numbers are not far from what is observed in the data or reported in the literature.
Prado (2011) backs out, using his model, the enforcement levels implied for a group of
countries, given their informal sector size and tax and regulation costs. The enforcement
numbers that emerge for high-tax, financially well developed economies (like Austria,
Denmark, Sweden and France) are very close to the values reported for p¯ in Table 3
above, for levels of FD between 100− 200%. In my sample of developed economies, the
highest level of FD is 327% for Luxembourg - which would correspond to p¯ = 0.51 in the
calibrated model.
In Brazil, the country to which the model is calibrated, tax evasion may be considered a
crime and get reported to Ministerio Publico. In this case, the penalty for tax evasion,
according to the Brazilian Constitution varies from six months to two years of detention
and requires a fine that varies from 2-5 times the amount of tax to be paid. Prado (2011),
however, generates an enforcement level for Brazil, that is around 43%. Given the high
penalties for evasion, this would imply a very low probability of audit (between 9-20% for
associated penalties of between 5 and 2 times the tax rate). Given that Brazil’s financial
markets are not as highly developed (World Bank’s private credit to GDP ratio for Brazil
is 69% for 2014), an enforcement level of 43% would be much below the threshold implied
by equation (17) indicating a positive relationship between tax and informality in Brazil.
Brazil recently instituted the National Plan to Combat Informality (Plancite), in May
2014, which includes among other things, stepping up visits by inspection teams to the
private sector to detect informality, and increasing the fines of violators. Given Brazil’s
large informal sector and poor state of public finances, this seems to be a step in the right
direction. Especially if Brazil were to raise taxes, in light of our results, a higher degree
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of enforcement is imperative in order to prevent pushing an even larger share of economic
activity into the informal sector. However, the present paper also suggests that Brazil
should pay equal attention to developing its largely bank-based financial markets. Bank
lending spreads in Brazil are about five times the OECD average which according to the
OECD survey (2011) on Brazil, are symptoms of a poorly functioning financial system
and increases the cost of capital. According to this paper, developing Brazil’s domestic
financial markets will increase the capacity and growth of the formal sector which will
raise the demand for formal labor contributing to higher market wages and making it
difficult for the informal sector to hire workers and grow even if taxes rise or enforcement
levels fall.
6. Productive government expenditures
Following Barro’s (1990) seminal paper there has been a lot of work on the role of pro-
ductive public expenditures in economic growth. In my model so far, government expen-
ditures are assumed to be wasteful. In this section I allow for productive government
expenditures in an alternative formulation of government spending to check whether
such an inclusion affects in any way the characterization of the enforcement threshold
in Section 4. Specifically, I assume that government expenditures enter the production
functions of entrepreneurs as follows,
yi,t+1 = Ai,tG
ζ
i,tl
α
i,t.
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i = {1, 2} stand for formal and informal entrepreneurs respectively and G is the amount
of public services available to each sector. Following Loayza (1997) I assume that the
amount of public services available to the informal sector is lower than the formal sector.
More specifically, G2,t = δG1,t, where δ < 1
4. Notice that the assumption of a less
productive informal sector relative to the formal sector implies that in addition to labor,
public services are also less productive in the former. This is similar to Zhang (2015)
who shows that disproportionate effects of public expenditures on different sectors play
an important role in the structural change of an economy as government spending grows
endogenously.
Entrepreneurs’ and the households’ solve the same problems as in Section 3. Of the total
tax revenue, T = τy1,t + pτy2,t, collected by the government, now a fraction, Gt = ψTt is
productive while the rest, g = (1 − ψ)T , is not. The first order conditions with respect
to labor in the two sectors are given by,
wt
1
c1,t
= (γ
1
c1,t+1
(1− τ) + λ1θ)αAtGζt lα−11,t (18)
wt
1
c2,t
= (γ
1
c2,t+1
(1− pτ))αφAtδGζt lα−12,t (19)
Equations (10) and (11) are the equivalent of equations (3) and (4) in Section 3. Note
that the amount of public services used by each sector now matter for the amount of
labor demanded in the respective sectors. Thus public services directly affect the labor
demand of formal and informal sectors. Proceeding as in Section 4, I calculate the steady
4Results do not change if we assume instead that only formal sectors have access to public services
as in Elgin (2015).
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state allocation of labor across sectors which in this case is given by,
s′ =
(
(1− pτ)φδζ
(1− τ) + (β−γ)θ
γ
) 1
1−α
. (20)
The relative size of the informal sector that emerges from equation (12) is now a direct
function of the share of public services in use by the informal sector, δ. The intuition is
that there is an added benefit to being informal in this economy which comes in the form
of free public services. In other words, informal firms do not pay taxes but enjoy the
productivity arising from the use of tax-paid public services, which makes them better
off than when there were no productive government spending in the economy. The larger
the share of public services available to informal firms relative to the formal sector, the
greater the gain from informality and larger the informal sector’s size.
Since the focus of my investigation is not what determines the informal sector but what
influences the tax-informality relationship, I differentiate, as in Section 4, the new steady
state allocation of labor s′ in equation (12) with respect to the tax rate, τ , to obtain
δs′
δτ
=
1
1− α
(
(1− pτ)φγδζ
γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ
) α
1−α (−pφγδζ(γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ)− (1− pτ)φγδζ(−γ)
(γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ)2
)
From above, for δs′/δτ > 0 it must be that
(1− pτ)φγ2δζ > pφγδζ(γ(1− τ) + (β − γ)θ)
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or,
p <
γ
θβ + (1− θ)γ
which implies p¯ = γ
θβ+(1−θ)γ . This is the same enforcement threshold as in equation (17).
Thus how productive government expenditures are do not matter for the value of p¯ in
this economy. It does matter, however, for the relative size of the informal sector.
7. Conclusion
Reducing informality is a common goal of policy in developing economies with their large
informal sectors. The benefits of a smaller informal sector range from higher productiv-
ity, greater competitiveness and more tax revenue for the government to more micro-level
gains such as better access to finance, better working hours, more unemployment in-
surance coverage and generally improved working conditions. Thus understanding the
determinants of informality has become an important goal for academics and policy mak-
ers as evidenced by the burgeoning research in this area. This paper contributes to this
agenda by exploring the link between taxation and informality.
I argue that this relationship depends importantly on the level of development of an econ-
omy’s enforcement and credit market institutions. In other words, the diverse quality and
level of tax enforcement and financial markets contribute to the contrasting effects of tax
rates on informal sector sizes across developed and developing economies with informality
rising with taxes in the former and falling with taxes in the latter. In a two-sector dynamic
general equilibrium model with borrowing constraints, I show that there is a threshold
level of tax enforcement below which informality and tax rates are positively related and
above which they are negatively related. This enforcement threshold in turn depends
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negatively on the degree of financial development in the economy. Enforcement works
by raising the expected cost of production in the informal sector through a combination
of higher probability of detection and stricter punishment while FD works by raising the
actual cost of informal production due to a higher competitive market wage. When FD
is higher, enforcement has to rise less before the informal sector is affected negatively
by the tax rate giving rise to a lower enforcement threshold. Productive government
expenditures do not play a role in the determination of the enforcement threshold but it
matters for the size of the informal sector itself. How would this last prediction change
if tax enforcement was costly? Intuitively, if higher enforcement entailed a greater cost
in terms of tax revenues, an increase in enforcement would cause productive government
expenditures to fall making less public services available to the formal (and informal)
sector. This would mean a relative detrimental effect of higher enforcement on the for-
mal sector since this sector is the main beneficiary of public services. Also, what happens
if the formal sector is allowed to default? In this paper we do not learn the answers to
these questions. These are, however, interesting questions for future research.
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